Introduction
In imperfectly discriminating contests the contestants contribute effort to win prize (s) and the highest effort does not necessarily secure a win (e.g. Dixit, 1987) . Such contests are typical inter alia in sport (e.g. Neale, 1964) . The existing literature largely concentrates on the single prize contests (e.g. Nitzan, 1994, p.52) despite overwhelming evidence that multiple prizes are awarded in real-life contests (e.g. Moldovanu and Sela, 2002 , Szymanski, 2003 , p.1142 . Clark and Riis (1998, pp. 616-617) and Szymanski (2003 Szymanski ( , pp. 1142 Szymanski ( -1143 concluded that a single prize is always optimal in symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests.
However, this result is only derived from an analysis of the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) demonstrated that multiple prizes can be optimal in perfectly discriminating contests if the cost of effort is sufficiently convex. Szymanski and Valletti (2002) demonstrated that multiple prizes can be optimal in asymmetric imperfectly discriminating contests when the contestants are sufficiently different in ability.
In symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests there may exist either a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium or asymmetric equilibria (e.g. Cornes and Hartley, 2003) . PerezCastrillo and Verdier (1992) demonstrated that the classical Tullock (1980) contest has a symmetric Nash equilibrium, asymmetric Nash equilibria, or a Stackelberg equilibrium. In this paper, I introduce multiple prizes into the Tullock (1980) contest in the same way as Clark and Riis (1998, pp.608-609) and Szymanski (2003 Szymanski ( , p.1142 . The complete structure of equilibria is analyzed, including the asymmetric equilibria ignored in Clark and Riis (1998) and Szymanski (2003 Szymanski ( , p.1142 . When the asymmetric equilibria are taken into account, a single prize is not necessarily the optimal prize structure for symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The complete structure of equilibria in the Tullock (1980) contest with a single prize is presented in section 2. Section 2 mainly restates the results from Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) . Additionally, I argue that the Stackelberg equilibrium arises endogenously for the parameterization incompatible with the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In Section 3, I analyze the Tullock (1980) contest with two prizes (e.g. Szymanski, 2003 Szymanski, , p. 1142 and demonstrate that the second prize may be optimal. Section 4 concludes. and it has been subsequently adopted in almost all studies of imperfectly discriminating contests (e.g. Corcoran, 1984 , Hillman and Samet, 1987 , Cleeton, 1989 , Perez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992 , Clark and Riis, 1998 , Szymanski and Valletti, 2002 , Szymanski, 2003 . Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998a) offered intuitive axiomatizations of the logit contest success function. 0 " r is the discriminating power of the contest success function and when +, * r the contest becomes perfectly discriminating like an all-pay auction (e.g. Krishna and Morgan, 1997, Clark and Riis, 1998b) . Assuming an individual's risk neutrality, each contestant maximizes the net expected value of his or her contributed effort (1). (1980) contest when 2 " r , i.e. when there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium? Hillman and Samet (1987) and Baye et al. (1994) derived the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution.
Tullock (1980) contest with a single prize

# $
However, Tullock (1987) questioned the relevance of mixed strategies as a solution concept for the imperfectly discriminating contests where the strategy space is continuous. Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992, pp. 344-345) Tullock (1980) contest the definitions of the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium coincide when 2 ) r . The result is remarkable because the Nash equilibrium continuously transforms into the Stackelberg equilibrium when the contest becomes sufficiently discriminating ( r passes the benchmark value of 2). Additionally, it extends the tendency of the Nash equilibrium to transform from the symmetric to the asymmetric equilibrium by decreasing the number of active contestants when the contest becomes relatively discriminating ( r passes the benchmark value of 1). Cleeton (1989, pp. 9-10) and Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992, pp. 343-344) discussed the endogenous entry-exit in the Tullock (1980) contest.
Let us consider in detail the Tullock (1980) Herrnstein, 1991, Herrnstein and Prelec, 1991) . The second contestant then obtains an incentive for active participation and the positive expected value for the first contestant gets eroded. Alternatively, the first contestant may set the effort (3), which is just sufficient to keep the second contestant away from participating. The Stackelberg equilibrium (3) arises endogenously in the Tullock (1980) 
EV(e 1 )>0 EV(e 2 )>0
provided experimental evidence that the Stackelberg equilibrium arises endogenously in the symmetric set-up. Further discussion of the endogenous Stackelberg equilibrium can be found in van Damme and Hurkens (1999) .
Equation (2) Szymanski, 2003 Szymanski, , p.1143 . The standard deviation of the contestants' effort is minimum (zero) only in the symmetric Nash equilibrium. The best policy to avoid the asymmetric equilibria in the single prize contest is to limit the number of contestants. However, when 2 " r the asymmetric equilibrium is unavoidable due to the exogenous nature of the discriminating power r. This problem can be cured with the introduction of multiple prizes as shown in section 3. ("over dissipation of rents" conjectured by Tullock, 1980) does not occur in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Tullock (1980) contest with two prizes
Consider the contest described in section 2 with two prizes V V 7
instead of the single prize V. Each contestant contributes an effort
, and has the probability & ' is "simply the probability of winning a contest with 1 4 n contestants conditional on not having won the first prize" (e.g. Szymanski and Valletti, 2002) . The optimization problem of each contestant is given by equation (4). Equation (4) is equivalent to equations (5)- (6) in Szymanski (2003) . (5) coincides with formula (7) in Szymanski (2003 Szymanski ( , p. 1143 ). The number m of active participating contestants in equilibrium is determined from the following constraint. An active contestant cannot contribute the effort (5) that yields the negative expected value (the expected value of zero effort is always zero). This results in constraint (6). . It is noteworthy that the upper bound on the discriminating power r of the contest success function compatible with the existence of the symmetric Nash equilibrium decreases in 7 . In other words, when more of a total prize fund V is shifted to the second prize, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is compatible with a wider range of the contest success functions. Equations (5)- (6) Nash equilibrium with at least three active contestants. It follows from constraint (6) that the number m of active contestants in an asymmetric Nash equilibrium increases when more of a total prize fund is shifted to the second prize.
It follows from (6) ). Each of two active contestants then has an incentive to contribute a very low effort (two prizes are more or less the same and there is no sense in strong competition). However, constraint (7) warrants each of the two active participants from reducing his or her effort too much. Otherwise, a third contestant becomes motivated in participation and the two incumbents cannot remain assured that they receive at least the second prize with certainty. Thus, in equilibrium one active contestant chooses the minimum effort 1 e so that the constraint (7) holds at most as equality (given an effort 2 e of the second contestant). He behaves strategically as if the Stackelberg leader is keeping other contestants away from participation. The second active contestant chooses his effort 2 e that maximizes the expected value (4) given that the first active contestant contributes 1 e and the remaining 2 4 n contestants contribute zero effort. He behaves as the classical Cournot-Nash best responder. . Such a contest is almost perfectly discriminating. Two active contestants cannot end up in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium (5) for the case 2 ) m . In the Nash equilibrium each active contestant has to contribute such a high effort that this effort has the negative expected value. Intuitively, if one contestant contributes low effort, the second contestant has the incentive to contribute a slightly higher effort. The second contestant then wins the first prize almost with certainty (the contest is almost perfectly discriminating) and his or her effort has the expected positive value. However, the first contestant then has the incentive to increase his or her effort and so forth. This situation is similar to the single prize contest when 2 " r .
Two active contestants cannot end up in a stationary equilibrium by best responding to each other's effort. Therefore, they contribute efforts does not occur. Table 1 conveniently summarizes the structure of equilibria in the Tullock (1980) contest with two prizes and 2 " n contestants. In the special case 2 ) n , the equilibrium is & ' 
7
, table 1 presents the structure of equilibria in the Tullock (1980) with the single prize (as presented in section 2). Table 1 The structure of equilibria in the Tullock (1980) contest with two prizes ( 2 " n )
Equilibrium effort of contestants
The intuitive explanation of the equilibrium structure from table 1 is as follows. When the contest is relatively undiscriminating, all contestants actively participate in the contest because there is a possibility to win a prize (almost by chance) while contributing low effort.
When the contest becomes sufficiently discriminating, up to 2 4 n contestants may drop out from the competition. The remaining active contestants are expected to contribute such a high effort that it erases any expectations of winning a prize for the passive contestants. However, when a prize fund is more evenly divided, fewer contestants drop out than when a prize fund is largely allocated to the first prize. Even when the contest is sufficiently discriminating, there is a higher chance to win one of two prizes than the single prize. When the contest is almost perfectly discriminating, only two contestants actively participate in equilibrium, which may be the Nash, mixed Nash-Stackelberg or two-player Stackelberg equilibrium.
Comparative statics
The contests' organizers may have three different objectives-to maximize an individual's effort ( # $ i n i e , 1 max % ), to minimize the standard deviation of the contestants' effort or to maximize the aggregate (average) effort. In other words, the contests' organizers may wish to observe the highest winning effort (the breaking of a world record), a close contest (a competitive balance resulting in an interesting competition) or to maintain the overall quality of the contest (e.g. Szymanski, 2003 Szymanski, , p. 1143 . Which prize structure suits each of these goals the best?
Suppose that the contests' organizers wish to maximize an individual's effort ( # $ Table 1 shows that the introduction of the second prize (decrease in 7 ) unambiguously reduces the highest submitted effort for all possible parameterizations. Thus, the single prize contest is the optimal contest architecture for maximizing an individual's effort. Figure 2 demonstrates this conclusion for a contest with 10 participants. Intuitively, when more of a total prize fund is shifted to the second prize, the expected value of winning either the first or the second prize increases. The chances of winning a prize become more favorable for each level of an individual's effort. Thus, active contestants are motivated to decrease their effort in equilibrium.
Additionally, there is an indirect effect. When more of a total prize fund is shifted to the second prize, the number of active contestants either increases or remains the same. This conclusion follows from the equilibrium conditions in table 1 -when 7 decreases, the number m of active contestants has to increase (to sustain the same discriminating power r). If more contestants actively participate in the contest, the active contestants are additionally motivated to reduce their effort (e.g. Cleeton, 1989, pp. 9-10; Szymanski, 2003 Szymanski, , p.1142 . the contest. When more of a total prize fund is shifted to the second prize, it has a twofold effect on the aggregate (average) effort contributed in the contest. On the one hand, the effort of active contestants unambiguously decreases (table 1 and figure 2). On the other hand, the number of active contestants may increase. Thus, the introduction of the second prize has an ambiguous effect on the aggregate (average) effort in the asymmetric equilibria. Figure 4 demonstrates this conclusion for the contest with 10 participants. When the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium is sustainable in the single prize contest ( 9 10 A r ), the introduction of the second prize always reduces the aggregate (average) effort. This result is well documented in the literature (e.g. Clark and Riis, 1998; Szymanski, 2003 Szymanski, , p.1142 . However, in the asymmetric equilibria the introduction of the second prize may increase the aggregate (average) effort when the number of active contestants increases (e.g. 6 . 1 , 10 ) ) r n ). The aggregate effort cannot exceed the total prize fund V (figure 4). It can fall short of V when the contestants end up either in the symmetric Nash equilibrium (the contest is poorly discriminating) or in the asymmetric equilibria with few active contestants (the contest is very discriminating). When the contests' organizers observe low aggregate effort with 100% participation, the problem is the poor discriminating power of the contest. Shifting more of a total prize fund away from the first prize cannot cure such problem (on the contrary it only aggravates the problem). However, when the contests' organizers observe low aggregate effort with many passive contestants, the problem is the extreme discriminating power of the contest.
In this case, if the discriminating power of the contest success function is known, the contests' organizers can calculate the optimal size of the second prize that maximizes the aggregate effort. When the discriminating power of the contest success function is unobservable, the contests' organizers may increase the number of active contestants by shifting more of a total prize fund away from the first prize. When only a few contestants (ideally one contestant) are endogenously passive, the aggregate effort is maximized. Generally, it may not reach its absolute maximum V but it cannot fall substantially short of V. When all but one contestant actively participate in the contest, even a small deviation of the aggregate effort from V is sufficient to trigger the endogenous entry and exit (e.g. figure 4 when 2 . 1 1 . 1 5 5 r ), which is observable for the contests' organizers. Thus, in order to maximize the aggregate effort, the contests' organizers should offer enough prizes to leave only a few (ideally one) passive contestants in the asymmetric equilibria.
Conclusion
This paper explores the asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric imperfectly discriminating contest with the logit contest success function and linear cost of effort, known in the literature as the Tullock (1980) The single prize is not necessarily the optimal prize structure when the contestants are identical in effort ability. Multiple prizes may be desirable when the contests' organizers wish to maintain a competitive balance or the overall quality of the contest. The introduction of multiple prizes always reduces the standard deviation of the contestants' effort when the majority (but not all) of the contestants actively participate in the contest. The introduction of multiple prizes may also increase the aggregate (average) effort contributed in the contest. On the one hand, multiple prizes always reduce the effort of active contestants. On the other hand, multiple prizes may increase the number of active contestants in the asymmetric equilibria.
Thus, the aggregate (average) effort always decreases in the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium but it may increase in the asymmetric equilibria with the introduction of multiple prizes.
Interestingly, in Ancient Greece the Olympics had only one official prize (an olive branch), which is the optimal prize structure for maximizing an individual's effort. In contrast, the modern day Olympics have three official prizes (gold, silver and bronze medals).
Apparently, during the last 2500 years the preferences of the general public have changed from an individual record-breaking performance in favor of interesting competition and/or a high overall quality of the contest.
If the discriminating power of the logit contest success function is known, the contests' organizers can design the optimal prize structure to meet their objectives. Further extension of this work could be to design the optimal prize structure when the discriminating power is unknown. This would be a quest for the probabilistically optimal prize structure that suits the objectives of the contests' organizers within the widest range of the contest success functions.
The single prize contest may be still probabilistically optimal though it is not necessarily optimal for a specific parameterization. It would be intriguing to explore under which conditions three prizes (commonly observed in the real-life contests) are desirable.
Imperfectly discriminating contests can be viewed in their relation to the all-pay auctions. When the contest becomes progressively discriminating, first the symmetric and then the asymmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) become unsustainable. Two alternative equilibrium solution concepts exist for the highly discriminating contests and allpay auctions. The first is the solution in mixed strategies. The second (advocated in this paper)
is the solution in pure strategies for the endogenous mixed Nash-Stackelberg or pure Stackelberg equilibrium. In the symmetric (common value) all-pay auction this solution concept yields the equilibrium where k participants bid exactly the value of one of k prizes and the remaining participants bid zero. This equilibrium contrasts with the solution in mixed strategies (e.g. Riis, 1998b, Moldovanu and Sela, 2001 ). The interpretation of such duality may be that the solution in mixed strategies is the mathematical method to model the natural indeterminacy of the asymmetric equilibrium when all participants are ex ante identical.
